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The Wage Impact of Undocumented Workers 
 
I. Introduction and Background 
 The United States has a long history of immigration debate.  Through the last century and 
into this one, immigration policy has been subjected to changing economic needs, fears, and 
political whims.  Positive contributions of immigration have been identified by Neal and 
Uselding (1972) who estimate that the flow of immigrants into the United States between 1790 
and 1912 resulted in a 13 to 42 percent higher level of capital stock than would have prevailed in 
the absence of immigration during these years (also see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995 and 
Chiswick et al. 1992).  Immigration has also been more recently explored in various countries as 
a mechanism for replacing retiring baby-boom workers (e.g., Hamada and Kato 2007, Hotchkiss 
2005, Denton and Spencer 1997).  
 Concerns surrounding immigration are rooted in an expectation that the arrival of new 
workers into a labor market would displace native workers and/or put downward pressure on 
wages.  The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact on wages of the presence of a 
specific class of immigrants -- undocumented workers.  The literature presents a wide range of 
estimates of the effects of immigration on wages and employment of native workers, but little is 
known about the impact of undocumented workers.  The conventional wisdom has been that a 10 
percent increase in the population share of immigrants results in a one to four percent decrease in 
native wages (for example, see Friedberg and Hunt 1995, Borjas et al. 2006, and Orrenius and 
Zavodny 2007).  The measured impact of immigration on the displacement of workers is less 
clear.  Card (1990), Wright et al. (1997), Butcher and Card (1991), and Card and DiNardo (2000) 
find no evidence of immigrant inflows affecting native migration patterns or employment 
outcomes.  Whereas, Frey (1996) and Borjas (2005) identify a significant relationship between 
 - 2 - 
immigrant inflows and either native outflows or lower net native in-migration, and Card (2001) 
finds lower rates of employment within cities with high immigrant arrivals. 
 More recent evidence from Peri (2009) and Peri and Sparber (2009) suggests that 
immigrants do not crowd-out employment of native born workers; there is no significant effect 
on hours worked of native born workers in the short run, but hours significantly increase in the 
long-run; and that there is no short-run impact on native worker income.  However, over time, a 
net increase of immigrants equal to one percent of employment significantly increases income 
per worker from 0.6 to 0.9 percent.  This positive impact on worker income derives from 
increased efficiency and productivity through task specialization, especially among low-skilled 
natives (also see Toussaint-Comeau 2007 and Cobb-Clark et al. 1995).  In the short-run, capital 
intensity is decreased as additions to the workforce are from lower skilled workers, but over time 
businesses expand their capital as they increase production.  These conclusions are consistent 
with those made in earlier work by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Chiswick et al. (1992), 
linking higher levels of immigration to capital deepening and higher per capita consumption. 
 While estimates of the impact of immigration as a whole on the labor market outcomes of 
native workers abound, much less is known about the impact of undocumented workers.  The 
reason is the dearth of information about the labor market presence or characteristics of 
undocumented workers.  To a certain extent, the impact of undocumented workers can be 
expected to be similar to that of immigrants as a whole; however there are some important 
differences between the two groups of workers.  First of all, the number of undocumented 
workers in any labor market is only a fraction of the total number of immigrants, suggesting the 
impact, in either direction, would be much weaker.  Second, undocumented workers are likely to 
be even more limited in their opportunities and therefore have lower elasticities of labor supply 
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(see Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli 2009).  This would tend to make them an even less expensive 
factor substitute for native labor of similar skill.  This lower elasticity of labor supply will also 
have implications for wage differentials between documented and undocumented workers.  The 
more concentrated undocumented workers are in an industry the greater is the opportunity for 
firms to exercise monopsony power and keep wages of undocumented workers low.  And, 
thirdly, certain skills, such as communication, are likely to be more lacking in undocumented 
workers (than in immigrants in general).  And, according to Peri and Sparber's (2009) model, the 
presence of undocumented workers with limited communication skills would provide 
opportunities for even low-skilled native workers (or their employers) to shift the native skill 
contribution to production toward those that are more highly rewarded (specializing in tasks 
requiring greater communication skills).1 
 The analysis in this paper makes use of longitudinal, administrative, individual-level data 
from the state of Georgia to investigate how the presence of undocumented workers affects the 
wages of documented workers.  Controlling for individual and firm level fixed effects, the results 
indicate that workers employed by single-establishment firms who hire undocumented workers 
can expect to earn wages about 0.15 percent lower than they would at a firm that does not 
employ undocumented workers, but the effect does vary across sectors, with evidence of a wage 
premium in low-skilled sectors in which communication skills could be valuable. 
 A. Immigration Policy 
 Immigration legislation dates from the founding of the nation.2  The two most recent 
Federal efforts to address concerns of undocumented immigration are the Immigration and 
Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
                                                
1 The importance of communication skills in occupational mobility is highlighted by Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 
(2000) who find that deficiency in English severely limits occupational mobility of undocumented workers.   
2 For historical details, see CBO (2006) and FAIR (2007).  
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Act (IIRIRA) of 1996.  Both of these laws were passed in response to the growing population of 
unauthorized immigrants identified at the time, however they were quite different in their 
approaches to addressing the concerns spawned by that growth.  Whereas the IRCA is best 
known for creating two amnesty programs for unauthorized immigrants, the focus of the IIRIRA 
was one of border enforcement (see Fix and Passel 1994 and Nuñez-Neto and Viña 2006 for 
more details). 
 Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, and in response to continued dramatic growth in 
unauthorized immigrants, there have been renewed calls for additional comprehensive 
immigration policy reform.  The absence of forthcoming Federal legislation has been the likely 
motivation of many states to pass state-level laws targeted at unauthorized immigrants.  The 
number of laws enacted has grown from 39 in 2005 to 208 in 2010 and 197 in 2011.3  Fifteen 
additional bills were passed out of legislatures in 2011, but vetoed by governors.  The first major 
immigration legislation in Georgia became law in July 2007 and the second in 2011.  The 
analysis in this paper makes use of data through 2006, so the relatively recent change in the legal 
environment in Georgia will not confound the current analysis. 
 B. Identifying Unauthorized Immigrants 
 Identifying unauthorized immigrants is the greatest challenge in investigating their 
impact.  The most common method used to estimate the number of unauthorized immigrants is 
the residual approach, or merely calculating the difference between the total measured foreign-
born population and the legal immigrant population (see Hanson 2006).  According to the latest 
figures, there are 11.2 million unauthorized immigrants living in the U.S. as of March 2010 
(Passel and Cohn 2011).  It is also estimated that about four percent of the total are located in 
                                                
3 See the National Conference of State Legislatures website, "Issues and Research: Immigration," 
<http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/state-laws-related-to-immigration-and-immigrants.aspx>. 
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Georgia.  Between 2000 and 2010, Georgia experienced one of the largest percentage increases 
of unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. -- 70 percent (Passel and Cohn 2011).  
 A second data source that has been used to look at unauthorized immigration is 
information on border apprehensions from the U.S. Border Patrol.  Estimating the level of 
unauthorized immigration using apprehension data is problematic, primarily because it is not 
only a function of the number of attempts to cross the border (which have been shown to vary 
with expected relative U.S./Mexico economic conditions), but also a function of the enforcement 
efforts of border patrol and a function of the number of attempts (see Hanson and Spilimbergo 
1999, and GAO 2006).   
 According to DHS estimates for January 2009, 62 percent of unauthorized immigrants 
come from Mexico, as compared to 55 percent in January 2000.  Therefore it is not surprising 
that surveys from Mexico constitute a third source of data on unauthorized immigrants.  The 
Mexican Migration Project (MMP) is a household survey conducted during the winter months 
when seasonal migrants return to Mexico.  The Legalized Persons Survey (LPS) is a survey of 
unauthorized immigrants who were granted permanent legal residence in the U.S. under the 
amnesty provision of the Immigration and Control Act of 1986.  In general, the MMP and LPS 
have been found to be more useful in characterizing undocumented immigrants than actually 
counting them.  Orrenius and Zavodny (forthcoming), using the MMP, report that over the 
period between 1980 and 2004, approximately 62 percent of migrants from Mexico were 
unauthorized.  
 Among the newest sources of data of information about immigrants is the New 
Immigrant Survey (NIS).  The data set now includes two waves of new legal permanent residents 
in the U.S., admitted in 1996 and 2003, and over-samples employment based immigrants.  The 
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immigrants are administered three surveys over a 12-month period and are asked a host of 
questions about their original entry into the U.S. and about their experiences since arriving.  
Jasso (2011) reports that roughly 40 percent of new legal immigrants in 2003 had some 
experience of being in the U.S. illegally at some time before attaining legal status.4  The 
percentage whose spell of illegality is most likely to have more immediately preceded 
legalization is about 12 percent (Jasso 2011: Table 6).  This does not mean that 12 (or even 40) 
percent of the undocumented workers eventually become documented, however, since those who 
obtain legal status are going to be a very select group of those who initially entered illegally 
(Jasso et al. 2000, p. 136). 
 This paper differs in the way in which unauthorized individuals are identified.  In 
addition, it is not the goal of this paper to obtain an accurate count of unauthorized immigrants, 
but to identify a reasonable sample with which to perform statistical analyses of labor market 
outcomes.   State administrative data are used to identify invalid social security numbers used by 
employers in reporting worker earnings.  It is a common misconception that all undocumented 
workers are working "off the books."  There is considerable evidence that many employers 
report, either knowingly or unknowingly, and pay taxes on the wages paid to undocumented 
workers.5  Unlike most other studies, the measure used here does not capture the supply of 
undocumented workers, but, rather, the demand, as the workers are identified through 
employment records.  The advantage of this data source is that it is not subject to sample 
selection issues plaguing survey results.  The disadvantage is that it does not capture 
                                                
4 Jasso et al. (2008) estimate that 32 percent of new adult immigrants granted legal permanent residence in the U.S. 
in 1996 had originally arrived in the U.S. illegally 
5 The Social Security Administration keeps track of wages reported by employers but cannot be matched to a valid 
name or SSN.  This repository of unmatched wages is referred to as the Earnings Suspense File (ESF).   It is widely 
agreed that the exponential growth in the ESF is attributable to the growth in unauthorized immigrants.  For tax 
years 2001 and 2002 alone, 1.8 billion dollars were placed into the ESF. 
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undocumented workers not reported on employers' payrolls.  However, the result is a sample of 
undocumented workers that represents about 20 percent of all undocumented workers in the state 
of Georgia. 
II. Data 
 The primary data used for the analyses in this paper are the Employer File and the 
Individual Wage File, compiled by the Georgia Department of Labor for the purposes of 
administering the state's Unemployment Insurance (UI) program.  These data are highly 
confidential and strictly limited in their distribution.  The data are available from the first quarter 
of 1990 through the fourth quarter of 2006.  The Employer File provides an almost complete 
census of firms in the U.S., covering approximately 99.7 percent of all wage and salary workers 
(Committee on Ways and Means 2004).6  The establishment-level information includes the 
number of employees, the total wage bill, and the NAICS classification of each establishment.  
The Individual Wage File, which links individual workers to their employer, is used to construct 
workforce characteristics at the firm level.  We take advantage of the longitudinal nature of the 
data to calculate the firm’s age, employment variability, turnover rates, and worker tenure.  The 
data also contain a 6-digit NAICS industry code and the county of location, allowing us to 
construct or merge in various industry- and county-level indicators.  
 We restrict the analysis to single establishment firms for two reasons.  First, workers are 
only linked to the firm in which they are employed.  If a firm has multiple establishments, we do 
not know at which establishment the worker is employed; nor do we know exactly the physical 
location of the firm, as the address in the file could correspond to the firm headquarters, physical 
location, mailing address, etc.; nor do we know, if a firm employed undocumented workers, in 
                                                
6 Certain jobs in agriculture, domestic services, non-profit organizations are excluded from UI coverage; excluded 
workers are not represented in the data.  
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which establishment those workers are employed or who are those undocumented workers' 
documented colleagues.  These problems of measurement error don't arise when we limit the 
analysis to single establishment firms.  The second reason we restrict the analysis is because it is 
a clear way to reduce the number of observations without employing some sampling scheme.  
The full data sample has over 178 million observations, restricting to single establishment firms 
reduces the sample by about half.  Conclusions are only generalizable to single establishment 
firms. 
 Regrettably, the data set contains no information about workers' demographics or, more 
importantly, immigration status.  However, again making use of the longitudinal nature of the 
data, we estimate an individual fixed effects model, allowing us to control for individual 
characteristics that do not vary over time (e.g., innate human capital, immigration status). 
 A. Using SSNs to Identify Undocumented Workers 
 Details of how the SSN is used to identify undocumented workers are contained in 
Appendix A.  The abbreviated version is that there are some easily identifiable ways in which a 
SSN is determined to be invalid.  We conclude that some of those reasons are either errors or the 
result of incomplete record keeping by the firm.  We restrict our identification of undocumented 
workers to invalid SSN that are more likely to have been generated by the workers -- numbers 
that look valid, but are not.  Workers with invalid SSNs for any other reason are considered 
neither undocumented nor documented and, thus, are excluded from the analysis; this will clearly 
undercount the actual number of undocumented workers.  However, all workers, regardless of 
SSN classification, are included in counts of aggregate firm employment.7 
 Figure 1 plots the prevalence of undocumented workers in the seven broadly defined 
                                                
7 The only other use of SSN to identify unauthorized immigrants we have found is by Maloney and Kontuly (2010) 
and Wen and Malony (2011), who identify Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers (ITINs) in driver's license 
records to track changes in neighborhood living conditions as these individuals change residences. 
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sectors with the highest incidences.  The concentration of workers in these sectors has also been 
identified nationally by Fortuny et al. (2007).8  The pattern of growth is also consistent with 
Fortuny et al. who estimate that 72 percent of unauthorized immigrants in Georgia arrived in the 
last 10 years.  
[Figure 1 here] 
 Fortuny et al. (2007) estimate that 4.5 percent of the workforce in Georgia was 
undocumented in 2004.  In our sample 1.0 percent of workers are classified as undocumented in 
2004, implying that the sample used for the analysis in this paper is capturing about 22 percent of 
all undocumented workers in the state of Georgia.  This is a respectable representation, given 
that to be included in the sample all workers have been included on the firm's wage report in the 
first place, and we are being very conservative in the identification of workers as undocumented.  
Note that the identification process we use in this paper does not make any assumptions about 
whether the employer knows a worker is documented or undocumented.  In addition, the goal of 
the conservative identification process is to end up with a sample in which we can have a high 
degree of confidence that the sample is representative of the undocumented workforce, not to 
actually count the number of undocumented workers in Georgia.  The implication of 
undercounting the number of undocumented workers present in the labor force has the potential 
to undermine our ability of identifying a statistically significant systematic effect of their 
presence on documented worker wages, hence likely underestimating any measured effect. 
 B. Are Undocumented Workers Correctly Identified? 
 There are several reasons we are confident that the sample of undocumented workers is 
representative.  First of all, the rate of growth seen in both the number and percent of 
                                                
8 Fortuny et al. (2007) estimate that nationally in 2004 the percent of workers in leisure and hospitality and 
construction that was undocumented was 10 percent each, nine percent of workers in agriculture, and six percent 
each in manufacturing, professional and business services, and other services.  Also see Pena (2009). 
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undocumented workers identified in Georgia matches closely the rate of growth in the Social 
Security Administration's (SSA) earnings suspense file (ESF).  The ESF is a repository of social 
security taxes paid by employers that cannot be matched to a valid name or SSN.  It is widely 
believed that this growth in the ESF reflects growing incidence of unauthorized work in the U.S. 
(Bovbjerg 2006). 
 Figure 2 plots the number of workers (panel a) and the percent of workers (panel b) 
identified as undocumented along with the size of the ESF.  This figure shows a remarkable 
consistency between the growth seen in workers identified as undocumented and the ESF.   
[Figure 2 here] 
 Data from Census and Homeland Security suggest that between 40 and 60 percent of 
Mexicans in the U.S. are undocumented, and that 61 percent of unauthorized immigrants come 
from Mexico.9  Clearly not all Hispanics are undocumented, or vice versa, however using 
weighted data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), we calculate the average annual 
growth in total workers and total number of foreign born, Hispanic workers in the U.S. and in 
Georgia in order to compare growth rates to those in our sample.  These results are reported in 
Table 1.  The workforce in GA grew faster over the period than the U.S. workforce (2.9 percent 
vs. 1.5 percent, respectively).  In addition, the number of foreign born, Hispanic workers in the 
U.S. grew faster (eight percent per year) than the overall workforce; this phenomenon has been 
documented by others (Passel and Cohn 2009).  But most importantly for our purposes is that the 
growth rate of foreign born, Hispanic workers in GA (roughly 27 percent per year), which is 
much larger than in the U.S. overall (also see Passel and Cohn 2009), is similar to the growth in 
                                                
9 The 2008 ACS estimates that 11.4 million people in the U.S. were born in Mexico 
(http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hispanic/cps2008.html).  The DHS estimates that 7.03 million 
undocumented workers from Mexico were in the U.S. in 2008 
(http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2008.pdf). 
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the number of workers in GA classified here as undocumented.  We also observe a similarly 
large growth rate in the number of foreign born, Hispanic workers with less than a high school 
degree (21%), among which we might expect a larger share of undocumented workers than 
among foreign born, Hispanics in general. 
[Table 1 here]   
 The close match in growth rates in the number of workers classified as undocumented 
with that of the SSA ESF and with the number of foreign born, Hispanic workers in Georgia as 
measured by the CPS, suggests that the mechanism employed in this paper to identify 
undocumented workers is accurate; it's clear that not all undocumented workers are being 
captured in the data, but likely represent the tip of the ice burg of hiring behavior of any firm.  
Any remaining mis-classifications will show up in the error term and limit the estimation in its 
ability to identify any systematic relationships between wages and the presence of undocumented 
workers. 
 C. What Do Firms Know and Does it Matter? 
 A natural question arises as to whether an employer knows when he/she is hiring an 
undocumented worker, and, more importantly, whether that knowledge has any implication for 
interpretation of the results in this paper.  If the undocumented worker is perfectly 
indistinguishable from documented workers then the only expected impact on wages is what 
would result from the increase in the supply of a substitute factor input--wages will fall (Borjas 
2009).  However, if the employer is able to identify the new workers as undocumented, and, 
thus, have limited employment opportunities (e.g., Bohon, et al. 2008) and are likely to accept a 
wage lower than his productivity (e.g., Hotchkiss and Quispe 2009), then there is room for 
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overall productivity gains and rents to either be enjoyed by the employer or shared with 
documented workers.   
 There is reason to expect that employers have a fairly good idea when a worker is 
undocumented.  Up to 60 percent of Mexicans in the U.S. are undocumented (see footnote 9), 
and, thus, ethnic Hispanic characteristics and limited English skills are features employers can 
use to identify which workers are likely undocumented; there is no need to carefully scrutinize 
the presented SSN to determine with a high degree of accuracy whether a worker is 
undocumented.  A firm's willingness, then, to hire undocumented workers will be a function of 
the expected benefit from hiring versus the expected cost of breaking the law.  These benefits 
and costs are likely to vary by industry and firm characteristics (such as firm size).  On the 
whole, the expected costs are considered to be relatively negligible, especially for a non-border 
state.  For example, CBO (2010) reports that 91 percent of all apprehensions of unauthorized 
immigrants occur at the border.  In addition, prior to 2006, workforce enforcement did not figure 
very large in efforts to combat unauthorized immigration (CBO 2006, also see Jordan 2011).   
 A firm's decision to hire undocumented workers, then, would depend on the assessments 
of costs and benefits to their own economic outcome and, simply, the ethics of the person 
making the hiring decision.  There is a possibility that firms that hire undocumented workers also 
have a higher propensity to break other laws; it's unclear how this propensity might be expected 
to affect wage determination policies. 
 D. Sample Means   
 Table 2 presents some sample means for workers classified as documented.  While 
worker and firm longitudinal characteristics are calculated beginning in 1990 (the first year of 
available data), estimations are performed on the sample period 1995-2005 to focus more acutely 
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on the greater prevalence of undocumented workers during this time period, and because some 
geographic regressors are only available beginning in 1995.  In addition, estimation is performed 
on single-establishment firms only.  Given that there are over 178 million observations in the full 
sample, estimation with high order fixed effects is cumbersome, at best (see Abowd et. al 1999).  
Restricting the estimation to single-establishment firms allows us to reduce the structure of the 
sample in a more predictable way than a random sampling of workers; wage variation that is 
correlated with whether a firm is multi-establishment or not will be lost.  However, since this 
paper is able to make use of the population of workers (at least the population employed in 
single-establishment firms), the estimates will not suffer from the attenuation bias highlighted in 
Aydemir and Borjas (2010).  The first column of Table 2 contains means for the full sample, the 
second column contains means for single-establishment firms only, and the third and fourth 
columns contains means only for single-establishment firms that do and do not hire 
undocumented workers.   
[Table 2 here] 
 There are some characteristic differences between single establishment firms and all 
firms; these differences should be kept in mind when interpreting the generalizability of the 
results.  First of all, the worker level characteristics are all quite similar across both types of 
firms, although workers in single establishment firms have moderately less tenure and work 
experience.  There is also somewhat greater variation in quarterly earnings among workers 
employed in single establishment firms. 
 Single establishment firms appear to be smaller and older and experience less churning 
than other firms.  The biggest difference comes in the distribution of workers across broad 
industry sectors.  There seems to be a greater share of workers employed in single establishment 
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firms found in construction, wholesale trade, professional and business services, and other 
services.  There is a noticeably smaller share in retail trade and education and health services.   
 Turning to differences across firms that hire and don't hire undocumented workers, firms 
that hire tend to be larger, experience greater churning, and are likely to operate in industries that 
employ fewer workers with college degrees.  The greater churning among firms that hire 
undocumented workers is consistent with earlier findings by Morales (1983) who suggests that 
these firms need greater workforce flexibility.10  Workers in these firms also exhibit shorter 
tenure, lower wages, and are more likely to either be newly hired or separating from their 
employer. 
 Among firms that employ undocumented workers, workers are more concentrated in 
industries characterized as low-skill and less concentrated in high-skill industries, compared with 
workers employed by firms not hiring undocumented workers.  The share of workers employed 
by firms who hire undocumented workers is much larger in agriculture, construction, 
manufacturing, and leisure and hospitality.  
III. Empirical Specification  
 A number of different approaches have been taken to quantify the impact of immigration 
on native worker wages and employment.  The most common strategy is used by Altonji and 
Card (1991) and in a number of papers by George Borjas (alone and with co-authors; 2003, 
2005, 2006).  The procedure makes use of decennial census data and standard linear regression 
to identify a relationship between the difference in the density of immigrants on wages or 
employment across geographic areas (usually metropolitan statistical areas, MSAs).  Various 
                                                
10 Churning is measured as the difference between worker flows and job flows divided by the average employment 
during the period.  Worker flows is the sum of hires and separations and job flows is net employment change. 
  𝐶𝐻𝑈𝑅𝑁!" = !"#$%!!"#$%$&'()* ! !!"!!!"!!!!"!!!"!! /! ,  𝑁! is the number of workers in time t (Burgess et al. 2001). 
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techniques (e.g., instrumental variables and fixed effects) have been employed to control for the 
endogeneity problem of immigrants selecting their geographic destination based on observed 
wages in those locations.   
 The issue of reverse causality through selection has been a significant concern of 
analyses estimating the impact of immigration on wages since, as it relates to the analysis in this 
paper, one can reasonably expect that firms paying higher wages will attract more undocumented 
workers, so the share of undocumented workers becomes a function of the wage paid by the firm.  
Regarding this concern, the analysis in this paper has two advantages.  First, the estimation 
includes as a regressor the percent of K-12 students that is Hispanic in the county in which the 
firm is located in order to capture potential supply effects from the firm's wage setting policy.  
Second, the estimation is performed at the individual level, where individual worker wages are 
modeled as a function of firm behavior. It's not likely that a firm bases its decision on whether to 
hire undocumented workers, or how many to hire, based on the observed wage of any single 
documented worker. 
 Endogeneity through omitted variables has also plagued studies of immigration effects on 
wages.  For example, if there are unobservable factors that both increase a documented worker’s 
wage and the probability that a firm hires undocumented workers (or hires more of them), this 
will result in spurious positive correlations between a worker's observed wage and a firm's 
observed hiring behavior (and vice versa).  Even though the data are not rich enough to allow for 
any attempts at instrumental variables estimation, all equations are estimated with as many other 
firm characteristics as possible that will proxy for unobservable firm characteristics. In addition, 
estimations will control for both individual fixed effects, which will account for time-invariant 
unobservable individual heterogeneity, and firm level fixed effects, which will control for time-
 - 16 - 
invariant correlation between a firm's wage setting policy and its tendency to hire undocumented 
workers.11   
 The primary advantage of the analysis in this paper is that it makes use of matching 
techniques in order to construct a synthetic control group for workers employed by firms that 
also employ undocumented workers. The goal is to obtain a control as similar to the treated 
worker as possible, and controlling for as much heterogeneity as possible. This alleviates 
concerns of selection by workers toward or away from firms with certain employment practices, 
allowing us to draw causal inferences on the implications for working in a firm that employs 
undocumented workers.  The analysis also includes proxies to control for supply of 
undocumented workers, total labor supply, and local labor market conditions through the 
unemployment rate.  The use of individual worker data and the fixed effects means the results 
are interpreted as within worker, within firm effects and won't suffer from composition bias, 
which may plague analyses at the broad geographic, industry, or firm level. 
 A. The Estimating Equation 
 The baseline estimating equation is specified as: ln𝑤!"# = 𝛽!𝑈!" + 𝛽!𝑈!"𝑃!" + 𝛽!!𝑥!" + 𝛽!!𝑦!" + 𝛿! + 𝜃! + 𝜏!"#, (1)  
where ln𝑤!"# is the log of the quarterly earnings of documented worker i at firm j at time t; 𝑈!" is 
equal to one if any undocumented workers were identified working in firm j at time t, zero 
otherwise; 𝑃!" is the percent of workers at firm j that is undocumented at time t (this is undefined 
if 𝑈!" = 0, so it enters interactively); 𝑥!" are individual characteristics expected to influence the 
observed base wage level; 𝑦!" are firm level characteristics expected to influence worker i's 
observed wage; 𝛿! is an individual fixed-effect; 𝜃! is a firm fixed-effect; and 𝜏!"# is the random 
                                                
11 Malchow-Møller et al. (2007) also use individual level, panel data to investigate the impact of immigrants on 
native wages in Denmark. 
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error.  The equation will also include a broad sector industry fixed-effect when estimated on the 
full sample. The model will also be estimated across categories of workers differentiated by 
sector.12  Year and quarter fixed effects are included to control for cyclical and seasonal variation 
in wages.  We also include interactions of sector and year fixed effects to control for the 
possibility of increasing saturation of undocumented workers across sectors over time. 
 Worker tenure and labor market experience is expected to positively influence wages (at 
decreasing rates) through the presence of firm- and general-specific human capital (Campbell 
1993 and Altonji and Shakatko 1987).  Indicators for whether the worker is newly hired at the 
firm (not employed by the firm in the four preceding quarters) or is separating (not employed by 
the firm in the following four quarters) are also included; these workers are likely to not have 
received a full quarter's worth of wages. 
 Firm size (measured by log employment) is included with the expectation that larger 
firms pay higher wages (Oi and Idson 1999).  Firm age (and its square) is also included, but the 
relationship between firm age and wages paid is less straightforward (Brown and Medoff 2003).  
A firm level measure of worker churning (among documented workers only) is included as a 
measure of employment cost, which might suggest lower wages at firms with greater churning 
(Burgess et al. 2001, see footnote 10).  By merging in additional data, we are able to assign 
rough measures of three or four digit industry level worker skill and labor intensity of the 
production process (see Appendix B).  Firms who employ higher educated workers are expected 
to pay higher wages, and we would expect to observe lower wages for workers employed at 
firms with a more labor intensive production process, ceteris paribus.  This is because capital is 
                                                
12 One might expect that the firm fixed-effect would capture the sector effect, as a firm's industry would not be 
expected to change over time.  However, firms do change industry from time to time as their primary business 
activity might change over time. In addition, given the heterogeneity on characteristics and presence of 
undocumented workers in each industry, we might expect for the effect of undocumented workers to also differ 
across industries. 
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typically found to be complimentary with higher skilled labor (for example, see Krussel et al. 
2000) suggesting that a production process that uses less capital (one that is labor intensive) will 
also employ lower skilled workers. 
 The unemployment rate in the county in which the firm is located and the population 
density of the county are included to capture overall worker demand and strength of consumer 
demand, along with potential alternative employment opportunities in the worker's geographic 
area.  We expect to see higher wages being paid by firms facing higher product demand and 
tighter labor markets.  And, as mentioned before, the percent of students in the firm's county that 
is Hispanic is also included to capture the potential supply of undocumented workers to the firm, 
although, clearly, not all Hispanics are undocumented workers, and vice versa. 
 With the specification estimated in this paper, the focus is on the workers' experiences 
within their employer; the analysis will have nothing to say about a more aggregated effect of 
undocumented workers at the industry or geographic level.  Other factors that are expected to 
modify the impact of undocumented workers on wages, such as a firm's "hiring intensity" (or, 
how often the firm hires undocumented workers), are captured by the firm fixed-effect.  
Unfortunately, there is rarely a clearly defined pre and post time period in which firm hires 
undocumented workers, making a difference-type analysis fruitless.   
 One question that presents itself in considering the impact of undocumented workers is 
what happens to workers who might be displaced when his/her employer begins hiring 
undocumented workers.  The analysis in this paper does not speak to this question.  Other work 
has compared the separation behavior of undocumented workers with that of documented 
workers (see Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli 2009), but a full analysis of long-term labor market 
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outcomes of potentially displaced documented workers will be the subject of a future 
investigation. 
 B. Flexible Functional Form 
 There is strong empirical evidence that relationship between wages and a firm's 
undocumented worker hiring behavior (𝑈!" and 𝑃!") might not be linear, as depicted in equation 
(1).  Figure 3 plots the coefficients on an estimated version of equation (1) that regresses 
workers' log wage on a set of dummy variables reflecting their firm's workforce share of 
undocumented workers for the full sample, agriculture, construction, and leisure & hospitality.   
[Figure 3 here] 
 Several things are apparent from this figure.  First, the relationship between wages and a 
firm's undocumented workforce share is likely to vary across sector.  Second, that relationship is 
also likely to vary across workforce share, with the relationship appearing to change somewhere 
between five and 10 percent.  And, third, the relationship appears to be quite small, especially at 
small workforce shares.  In order to allow as flexible a relationship as possible between wages 
and the hiring behavior/intensity of firms, equation (1) is estimated as, at most, a six-order 
polynomial with regard to the interaction term (𝑈!"𝑃!"); results are reported for the polynomial 
order in each sector (and the full sample) that best fits the data, based on the Akaike information 
criteria.13  
Since the baseline model assumes that the presence of even one undocumented worker 
(or the presence of one invalid SSN) in any quarter means the firm employed undocumented 
workers during that quarter, it is possible that there may be a certain degree of measurement 
                                                
13 While it is typical to limit functional flexibility to three polynomial terms, we found a significant difference in 
results between the specification with three and six terms, however, no difference in conclusions beyond the 
inclusion of six terms (up to nine).  In addition, full non-parametric estimation of this relationship is precluded by 
the desire to control for both firm and individual fixed effects in the estimation. 
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error in identifying a firm that employs undocumented workers if the reporting and recording of 
SSNs is error prone. We find that allowing for the greater flexibility in functional form reduces 
to negligible the sensitivity of results to more rigid definitions of undocumented worker 
employment (e.g., requiring a certain workforce percentage before declaring the firm employs 
undocumented workers). 
 C. Matching 
 The goal of the empirical analysis is to determine what the implications for a documented 
worker's wage is of working in a firm that employs undocumented workers compared to working 
in a firm that does not employ undocumented workers.  To be able to draw causal inference the 
estimation needs to be free of any individual selection by workers toward or away from firms 
that employ undocumented workers and to control for as much worker and firm heterogeneity as 
possible.  A technique that has been often used in the absence of a random experiment or 
appropriate instruments, is to construct a synthetic control group through matching techniques 
(see Imbens 2004).14  The goal is to find a control observation for each worker who has been 
"treated" by working in a firm that employs undocumented workers.  This control will be as 
similar to the treated worker in as many dimensions as possible, except the control will be 
employed in a firm that does not hire undocumented workers.  Details of the matching 
methodology and results are contained in Appendix C. 
IV. Estimation Results 
 A. Matching 
 Appendix C contains the estimation results from the propensity score matching exercise, 
as well as evidence that the matching strategy was successful in that it significantly reduced the 
                                                
14 Heyman et al. (2007) use matching techniques and a linked employer-employee data set to investigate the 
presence of a foreign ownership wage premium among workers in Sweden. 
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bias between the means of workers employed by firms who hire undocumented workers and by 
firms that do not.  Appendix C also contains logit estimates corresponding to the propensity of a 
worker to be observed working in a firm the employs undocumented workers.  Estimates for the 
full sample are presented; those for each sector separately are available upon request.  Results are 
fairly consistent across sectors.  A worker is more likely to be employed in a firm that hires 
undocumented workers if the worker has lower tenure; less labor market experience; is a new or 
separating worker; and is employed in a small, young firm with a high amount of churning.  
Being employed in a county with a larger share of Hispanic students in the school system, 
greater population density, and lower unemployment increase a worker's chances of being 
employed by a firm that also hires undocumented workers. 
 B. Wage Regression Results 
 Table 3 contains parameter estimates for equation (1) estimated for the full sample with 
the full set of firm and individual level fixed effects, as well as an estimation via OLS without 
fixed effects.  Both OLS and fixed effect models are estimated using the same matched sample 
and functional form. The preferred model, based on the AIC, for the full sample is a sixth order 
polynomial.  Parameter estimates for each sector separately are found in Appendix D. 
 [Table 3 here] 
 Focusing first on the fixed effects estimation results and the impact of the control 
variables, the impact of the worker and firm characteristics on wages earned by documented 
workers is as expected.  Wages are increasing, at a decreasing rate, as tenure and overall work 
experience increases.  Being either a new hire or one about to separate leads to much lower 
observed wages.  The sizes of the estimated coefficients reflect the high probability that these 
workers are likely to be working less than a full quarter during their employment transition (thus 
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being observed with considerably lower earnings).  Workers can expect to earn higher wages if 
employed at larger and younger firms, firms that employ workers with more education, and firms 
that are less labor intensive.  Higher wages are also found among workers employed at firms 
with higher levels of churning.  The churning result suggests that firms with high levels of 
churning may pay an efficiency wage to reduce churning, which can be costly. 
 Workers facing a higher unemployment rate in the county and quarter in which their 
employer is located can expect to earn a lower wage, but wages are higher in more densely 
populated counties.  In addition, wages are significantly lower in counties with higher levels of 
Hispanic populations. 
 The importance of controlling for individual and firm level fixed effects is apparent even 
before considering the impact of the presence of undocumented workers on wages.  While most 
of the point estimates across the two columns are similar in sign and magnitude, there are some 
exceptions.  For example, the estimated impact of tenure is roughly four times larger when one 
does not control for individual fixed effects.  In addition, the relationship between churning and 
wages is negative when firm level fixed effects aren't included, the OLS results would suggest 
that workers earn a higher wage working in a county with a higher share of Hispanics, and the 
role of the unemployment rate and population density is much larger in the absence of individual 
and firm level fixed effects. 
 Before turning to the overall marginal effect of working at a firm that employs 
undocumented workers, further evidence of the importance of controlling for fixed effects can be 
seen in the first row of Table 3.  Without considering the interactions with the share of workers 
undocumented, the coefficient on whether or not the firm employs undocumented workers is a 
large negative number when estimated without fixed effects, and small and positive when fixed 
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effects are included; controlling for firm and individual fixed effects is clearly important. 
 Table 4 presents the average marginal effect on a documented workers' wages of being 
employed at a firm that also employs undocumented workers, relative to being employed at a 
firm that does not hire undocumented workers.  Since the relationship between wages and the 
undocumented workforce share is highly non-linear in some sectors (and the full sample), these 
marginal effects are presented at different points of the distribution of workers across firms' 
undocumented workforce shares.  The undocumented workforce share at each of the respective 
points of the distributions are in brackets below the marginal effect. 
[Table 4] 
 For the full sample of workers across all sectors, a documented worker at a firm with an 
average undocumented workforce share (3.24%) suffers a 0.15 percent wage penalty compared 
to what that worker would earn if employed by a firm that did not hire any undocumented 
workers.  Figure 4 illustrates the information contained in Tables 4 for the full sample and some 
select individual sectors.  As can easily be seen from Figure 4, the distribution of workers across 
firms' undocumented workforce share is highly skewed to the right; less so in agriculture and 
construction.  Except in agriculture, half of workers employed at firm who hire undocumented 
workers in all sectors are employed in firms whose undocumented workforces share is less than 
five percent.  And only in construction (other than agriculture) does that share exceed three 
percent. 
[Figure 4 here] 
 The marginal effects reported in Table 4 indicate that in most sectors, workers can expect 
to earn a statistically significantly higher wage if employed by a firm that does not also hire 
undocumented workers, compared to what he/she would earn at a firm that employs an average 
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share of undocumented workers.  However, the practical magnitude of that difference is 
questionable.  The largest penalty for working at a firm that hires undocumented workers is 1.7 
percent in professional and business services.  This amounts to about $192 per quarter (the 
average quarterly earnings of a documented worker in a professional and business services firm 
not hiring undocumented is $11,303).  In addition, there are two notable sectors in which 
documented workers earn a premium for being employed at firms that hire undocumented 
workers.  Workers employed at firms in retail trade and leisure and hospitality that hire an 
average share of undocumented workers will earn a 0.6 and 0.3 (respectively) percent wage 
premium (roughly $39 and $9, respectively, per quarter) compared to being employed in the 
same sectors at a firm that does not hire undocumented workers.  However, these, too, while 
statistically significant, are of questionable importance.  On the other hand, in retail trade, for 
example, the premium rises with the firm's undocumented workforce share so that a worker 
employed in a firm that is in the 90th percentile of workforce share (7.69 percent) will be earning 
a two percent wage premium ($131/quarter) relative to what he/she would earn in a firm in retail 
trade not employing undocumented workers (see Figure 4, as well for a visual illustration). 
 C. A Wage Premium? 
 For the most part, although statistically significantly different from zero, there is only a 
negligible impact of working at a firm that also employs undocumented workers.  But in some 
sectors, that impact, although also negligible, is positive.  This seems to be counter-intuitive.  
However, a positive expected wage impact is consistent with results of Peri (2006) and Peri and 
Sparber (2009), who conclude that increased immigration leads to increased efficiency and 
productivity through task specialization.  At the firm level this might manifest itself in 
documented manual laborers being reassigned to tasks that require more communication skills 
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(or oversight of the new undocumented labor), while the undocumented workers specialize in the 
manual labor tasks.  The net result is a more efficient production process with documented 
workers (especially low-skill documented workers) being more productive and earning higher 
wages (also see Orrenius and Zavodny 2007, and Hanson 2007).15  In addition, Brown et. al 
(2012) find that firms who hire undocumented workers have a competitive advantage and 
employers may share rents from this advantage with their documented workforce.  Further, the 
availability of lower cost, low-skill workers could result in a scale effect with firms producing 
more, using more capital, and hiring workers complementary to capital (documented, higher-
skilled workers); see Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and Brown et. al (2010).  It may also be the case 
that documented workers require a compensating differential for their discriminatory negative 
attitudes toward unauthorized immigrants or Latinos, in general (see Cowan et al. 1997). 
 Other studies have found fairly strong negative impact of the arrival of immigrants on 
wages of previous wages of immigrants (e.g., Ottaviano and Peri 2006 and Lalonde and Topel 
1991).  Since we cannot identify immigration status among our documented workers, there are 
surely immigrants among them who are likely to experience a negative consequence of the 
presence of undocumented workers.  The implication is that our results are likely biased toward 
finding a negative wage impact, which means the very small negative impact estimated is likely 
even closer to zero than reported here, and the positive impact may be even be a larger positive 
impact. 
V. Conclusions and Implications for Policy 
 Using individual-level data, linked to employer characteristics, the analysis in this paper 
finds that a documented worker employed at a firm that hires the average share of undocumented 
                                                
15 Iskander (2011) suggests that this productivity gain may derive from the transformation of immigrants' tacit 
knowledge in a new environment into innovation and improved production processes. 
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workers (among firms hiring undocumented workers) can expect to earn a 0.15 percent lower 
wage than if he/she worked at a firm that does not employ undocumented workers.  This effect of 
working in a firm that employs undocumented workers varies across sectors, is even positive in 
two notable sectors (retail trade and leisure & hospitality), but is small in every sector.  The 
largest negative impact is found among workers in agriculture employed in firms in the 90th 
percentile of firms' undocumented workforce share (20% or more of the firm's workforce is 
undocumented).  Documented workers in these firms earn roughly three percent less than they 
would if employed in an agricultural firm that does not hire undocumented workers.  This 
amounts to less than $300 per quarter. 
 The premium earned by documented workers employed by firms that hire undocumented 
workers in the retail trade and leisure and hospitality sectors, although, again, small, warrants 
some additional consideration since this result may have some implications for other results 
found in the literature.  Peri (2009) and Peri and Sparber (2009) suggest that efficiency and 
productivity can benefit from the task specialization that is likely to result as firms hire low-skill 
immigrants to perform the tasks previously performed by natives.  The natives are re-assigned to 
relatively higher-skilled tasks that make better use of their comparative advantage, say, 
communication.  Both retail trade and leisure and hospitality, unlike other immigrant-rich sectors 
like agriculture, construction, and manufacturing, are sectors in which there is ample opportunity 
for customer contact and specialization in communication-intensive activities. 
 The bottom line from the analysis in this paper is that whether a worker experiences a 
premium or a penalty from working at a firm that also employs undocumented workers, that 
impact is expected to be very small.  There is reason to believe that actual experience is even 
smaller than that estimated here, but one could argue that as the share of undocumented workers 
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increases in the labor market, these impacts could grow, as well.  In addition, the analysis in this 
paper is a partial equilibrium analysis and does not consider the long-run implications for 
technology or capital usage by the firm from increasing employment of undocumented workers.  
Further, the analysis in this paper says nothing about the impact of the presence of 
undocumented workers on overall employment, prices, or economic growth.  
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                         Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Growth in the earnings suspense file and the total number and percent of workers 
identified as undocumented in Georgia, 1990-2006. 
   
Source: Huse (2002) for estimates 1990-2000, Johnson (2007) for estimates 2001-2004, and authors' 
calculations.  Dollar estimates reflect 2006 values, using the PCE chain-weighted deflator. 
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Figure 3. Linear probability model estimated with dummy variables for each share of undocumented workers on firms' payrolls. 
    
 
    
   
Notes: Estimation using final matched, trimmed samples. 
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Figure 4. Estimated marginal effects of being employed by a firm that hires undocumented workers, with the distribution of workers across 
undocumented workforce share. 
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Table 1.  Average annual growth, 1994-2006, in US and GA employment, Hispanic workers, and 
workers identified as undocumented. 
 
Average Annual Growth Rate of: 
 
Total number of workers in the U.S. 1.48% 
Total number of foreign born, Hispanic workers in the U.S. 8.03% 
Total number of foreign born, Hispanic workers with less 
than a high school degree in Georgia 
 
7.28% 
Total number of workers in Georgia 2.92% 
Total number of foreign born, Hispanic workers in Georgia 26.82% 
Total number of foreign born, Hispanic workers with less 
than a high school degree in Georgia 
 
21.48% 
Total number of workers in GA identified as undocumented 25.29% 
Source: Current Population Survey, Basic Survey (March), 1994-2006; and authors' calculations. 
Note: 1994 is used as starting year since is the first year the Current Population Survey has a 
reliable indicator of Hispanic ethnicity. 
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Table 2. Sample means, documented workers, 1995-2005.  
   Single Estab. Firms 
 
Full 
Sample 
 
 
 
Single 
Establish-
ment Firms 
Only 
Workers 
employed at 
firms with at 
least one 
undocumented 
worker 
(𝑈!" = 1) 
 
Workers 
employed at 
firms with no 
undocumented 
workers 
(𝑈!" = 0) 
Worker Characteristics     
Quarterly wages $8,277 
(11,522) 
$8,547 
(12,741) 
$6,520 
(9,711) 
$9,272 
(13,589) 
Worker tenure (quarters) 13 
(14) 
11 
(13) 
9 
(12) 
12 
(13) 
Worker experience (quarters) 26 
(16) 
25 
(16) 
22 
(16) 
26 
(16) 
Worker is a new hire = 1 0.17 0.18 0.26 0.16 
Worker is separating = 1 0.17 0.18 0.25 0.16 
 
Firm Characteristics (firm-level means) 
    
Percent of firms hiring undoc (𝑈!")  5.0% -- -- 
Percent of workers at firm that is undoc. (𝑃!")  0.56% 
(2.79) 
0.54% 
(3.4) 
11% 
(10.9) 
-- 
Firm size (number of workers) 21 
(207) 
15 
(87) 
83 
(287) 
12 
(58) 
Age of firm (quarters) 16 
(14) 
25 
(17) 
28 
(18) 
25 
(17) 
Churning at worker's firm (doc. workers only) 0.24 
(0.38) 
0.14 
(0.29) 
0.34 
(0.33) 
0.13 
(0.29) 
Share of workers with college degree or 
higher (determined at 3-digit NAIC level)a 
 24% 
(0.16) 
15% 
(0.12) 
25% 
(0.16) 
Labor share in production process 
(determined at 3- or 4-digit NAIC level)a 
 40% 
(0.15) 
38% 
(0.12) 
40% 
(0.15) 
 
Geographic Controls 
    
Population density (population/sq mi) 1,032 
(770) 
981 
(770) 
1,082 
(757) 
945 
(772) 
County unemployment rate 4.49 
(1.30) 
4.49 
(1.35) 
4.42 
(1.26) 
4.51 
(1.39) 
Percent of county school enrolment that is 
Hispanic 
5% 
(5) 
5% 
(5) 
5% 
(5) 
5% 
(5) 
 
NAICS Sector Employment Shares 
    
Natural Resources and Agriculture 0.9% 1.4% 2.4% 1.0% 
Construction 5.1% 8.9% 10.3% 8.4% 
 - 40 - 
Manufacturing 13.5% 13.5% 16.2% 12.5% 
Transportation and Utilities 4.4% 3.8% 2.5% 4.3% 
Wholesale Trade 4.8% 7.0% 3.4% 8.3% 
Retail Trade 13.4% 9.1% 5.1% 10.5% 
Financial Activities 5.3% 5.8% 2.1% 7.1% 
Information 3.4% 3.0% 2.7% 3.1% 
Professional and Business Services 
(includes temporary services) 
14.8% 17.8% 22.9% 16.0% 
Education and Health Services 17.2% 15.7% 14.4% 16.2% 
Leisure and Hospitality 10.4% 10.0% 16.0% 7.8% 
Other Services  
(includes private household, laundry, and 
repair and maintenance services) 
2.6% 4.0% 1.9% 4.7% 
No. of observations 178m 99,868,841 26,313,397 73,555,444 
Notes: Wages are real quarterly earnings, deflated by the chained price index for personal consumption 
expenditure $2006Q4.  Individual sample means are across workers.  All averages reflect four quarters of data 
for each year. Standard errors are in parentheses.  Note in comparing values across years that 1990 is the first 
year in which any firm or worker is observed in the data.  See Appendix B for details related to the construction 
of high education, labor intensity, and broad sector classifications. 
a In order to conserve space, the variables are not merged into the full data set. 
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Table 3. Linear, fixed effects estimation of log wages. 
 
Dependent variable = Log(wage) 
Includes individual 
and firm level F.E. 
(1) 
OLS estimation 
(no F.E.) 
(2)  
Firm hires undocumented workers (𝑈!")  0.0012*** -0.0489*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0006) 
   
Coefficients for Percent undocumented interaction are available upon request. 
Worker Characteristics   
Worker tenure (in quarters) 0.0078*** 0.035*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Worker tenure squared / 1000 -0.1079*** -0.4396*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0012) 
Worker experience (in quarters) 0.0096*** 0.0089*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) 
Worker experience squared / 1000 -0.0731*** -0.0515*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0008) 
Worker is new hire = 1 -0.7021*** -0.7542*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Worker is separating = 1 -0.8931*** -1.1024*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Firm Characteristics   
Age of firm (in quarters) -0.0132*** -0.0100*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0001) 
Age of firm squared / 100 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Log total employment (firm size) 0.1539*** 0.0351*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0002) 
Churning at worker's firm (documented wrkrs only) 0.1461*** -0.6065*** 
(0.0012) (0.0009) 
Share of workers with higher education -0.01690 0.6171*** 
(0.0110) (0.0019) 
Labor intensity -0.0564*** -0.3263*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0022) 
Geographic Controls   
County unemployment rate -0.0057*** -0.0279*** 
 0.00023 0.00017 
Population density /1000 0.00001*** 0.00014*** 
 0.00000 0.00000 
Percent of students that is Hispanic -0.0828*** 0.2664*** 
 0.01108 0.00409 
   
Intercept  8.1743*** 
  (0.0085) 
R-squared 0.8657 0.4420 
 - 42 - 
No. of Observations 32,085,002 32,085,002 
Note: Both models presented here reflect the preferred specification based on criteria described in text (see equation 1; a 6th 
order polynomial is the preferred specification for the full sample).  Standard errors in parentheses.  Analysis includes 
documented workers employed in Georgia 1995-2005 inclusive.  Also included as regressors are broad sector industry fixed 
effects (see Appendix B) and year and quarter fixed effects, as well as sector/year interactions.   𝑃!" is measured from 0 to 
100.  *** statistically significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level, ** statistically significantly different 
from zero at the 95% confidence level, and * statistically significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence level. 
 
 - 43 - 
 
Table 4. Marginal effects on documented worker wages, by industry, across the distribution of undocumented workforce shares; undocumented 
workforce shares (%) across the distribution are in brackets. 
Industry 
Average expected wage difference 1𝑁 ln𝑤!" !!!!   −    ln𝑤!" !!!!!!  Average Quarterly Earnings Among Documented 
Workers at Firms 
(no Undoc Wrkrs) at Mean P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 
Full Sample -0.0015** 
[3.24] 
 
0.0035*** 
[0.08] 
0.0027*** 
[0.29] 
0.0003 
[1.16] 
-0.0012* 
[3.92] 
0.0095*** 
[9.59] 
$9,272 
Ag and Natural Resources 
 
-0.0152** 
[10.12] 
 
0.0204*** 
[1.61] 
-0.0103** 
[4.39] 
-0.0163*** 
[9.09] 
-0.0151** 
[14.75] 
-0.0298*** 
[19.66] 
$7,121 
Construction -0.0031** 
[6.21] 
 
-0.0027* 
[0.72] 
-0.0027** 
[1.69] 
-0.0029** 
[4.17] 
-0.0033* 
[8.97] 
-0.0038 
[14.29] 
$8209 
Manufacturing -0.0063*** 
[3.24] 
 
0.0088*** 
[0.10] 
0.0068*** 
[0.29] 
-0.0005 
[1.20] 
-0.0054*** 
[4.24] 
0.0174*** 
[9.76] 
$9,766 
Transportation and Utilities -0.0063*** 
[1.89] 
 
0.0088*** 
[0.07] 
0.0068*** 
[0.22] 
-0.0005 
[0.70] 
-0.0054*** 
[1.90] 
0.0174*** 
[4.88] 
$9,349 
Wholesale Trade -0.00002 
[4.57] 
 
0.0138*** 
[0.27] 
0.0103*** 
[0.70] 
0.0022 
[2.34] 
0.0018 
[6.44] 
0.007 
[12.34] 
$13,307 
Retail Trade 0.0062*** 
[2.82] 
 
-0.0017 
[0.22] 
-0.001 
[0.45] 
0.0007 
[1.03] 
0.0063*** 
[2.86] 
0.021*** 
[7.69] 
$6,552 
Financial Activities -0.0024 
[1.94] 
 
 
0.0022 
[0.09] 
0.0019 
[0.22] 
0.0009 
[0.58] 
-0.002 
[1.75] 
-0.0067 
[5.00] 
$12,258 
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Information 0.0086*** 
[0.59] 
 
0.0241*** 
[0.04] 
0.0234*** 
[0.06] 
0.0207*** 
[0.14] 
0.0136*** 
[0.38] 
-0.0033 
[1.25] 
$14,267 
Professional and Business Srvcs -0.0173*** 
[2.81] 
 
0.0004 
[0.01] 
-0.0021 
[0.42] 
-0.0074*** 
[1.03] 
-0.0169*** 
[2.70] 
-0.0179*** 
[8.21] 
$11,303 
Education and Health Services -0.0021*** 
[0.50] 
 
-0.003*** 
[0.01] 
-0.0029*** 
[0.03] 
-0.0028*** 
[0.12] 
-0.0024*** 
[0.33] 
-0.0012 
[0.93] 
$8,855 
Leisure and Hospitality 0.0034** 
[3.79] 
 
0.0034* 
[0.33] 
0.003* 
[0.95] 
0.0028* 
[2.27] 
0.0046** 
[5.00] 
0.0108*** 
[8.89] 
$3,056 
Other Services 0.0021 
[5.18] 
-0.0043 
[0.39] 
-0.0036 
[0.88] 
-0.0012 
[2.70] 
0.0045 
[6.98] 
0.013* 
[13.33] 
$6,162 
Note: *** statistically significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level, ** statistically significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level, and * 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence level.  Earnings are real quarterly earnings, deflated by the chained price index for personal consumption 
expenditure $2006Q4. 
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Appendix A: Using SSNs to Identify Undocumented Workers 
 A.1. Identifying Invalid Social Security Numbers 
 Every quarter employers must file a report with their state's Department of Labor 
detailing all wages paid to workers who are covered under the Social Security Act of 1935.  Each 
worker on this report is identified by his/her social security number (SSN).  There are a number 
of ways in which one can establish that a reported social security number is invalid.  The Social 
Security Administration provides a service by which an employer can upload a file of SSNs for 
checking, but one must register as an employer to obtain this service.i  In addition, there are 
several known limitations on what can be considered a valid social security number, so a simple 
algorithm is used to check whether each number conforms to the valid parameters.  
 There are three pieces to a SSN.ii  The first three numbers are referred to as the Area 
Number.  This number is assigned based on the state in which the application for a SSN was 
made; it does not necessarily reflect the state of residence.  The lowest Area Number possible is 
001 and the highest Area Number ever issued, as of December 2006, is 772.  Using information 
provided by the SSA, the dates at which area numbers between 691 and 772 are first assigned 
can be determined.  Any SSN with an Area Number equal to 000, greater than 772, or which 
shows up before the officially assigned date, will be considered invalid. 
 The second piece of a SSN consists of the two-digit Group Number.  The lowest group 
number is 01, and they are assigned in non-consecutive order.  Any SSN with a Group Number 
equal to 00 or with a Group Number that appears in the data out of sequence with the Area 
Number will be considered invalid. 
                                                
i See Social Security Number Verification Service <http://www.ssa.gov/employer/ssnv.htm>. 
ii Historical information and information about valid SSNs can be found at the Social Security Administration's web 
sites: <http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssn/geocard.html>,  <http://www.xocialsecurity.gov/employer/stateweb.htm>, 
and <http://www.socialsecurity.gov/employer/ssnvhighgroup.htm >. 
 - A2 - 
 The last four digits of a SSN are referred to as the Serial Number.  These are assigned 
consecutively from 0001 to 9999.  Any SSN with a Serial Number equal to 0000 is invalid. 
 In 1996 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) introduced the Individual Tax Identification 
Number (ITIN) to allow individuals who had income from the U.S. to file a tax return (the first 
ITIN was issued in 1997).  It is simply a "tax processing number," and does not authorize an 
individual to work in the U.S.  Employers are instructed by the IRS to "not accept an ITIN in 
place of a SSN for employee identification for work.  An ITIN is only available to resident and 
nonresident aliens who are not eligible for U.S. employment and need identification for other tax 
purposes."iii  ITIN numbers have a "9" in the first digit of the Area Number and a "7" or "8" in 
the first digit of the Group Number.  Anyone with this numbering scheme will be identified as 
having an invalid Area Number; the percent of SSNs with high area numbers that also match the 
ITIN numbering scheme has risen from about one percent in 1997 to over 60 percent by the end 
of 2006.  
 A series of SSNs were de-commissioned by the Social Security Administration because 
they had been put on fake Social Security Cards used as props to sell wallets.iv  Apparently, some 
people who purchased the wallets thought the fake Social Security Cards were real and started 
using them as their own.  If any of these 21 "pocketbook" SSNs appear in the data, they are 
considered invalid, although their frequency is so low as to be inconsequential.  In addition, a 
number of SSNs are exactly equal to the employer identification number.  These are invalid, 
primarily because they have too few digits.  In any instance where a SSN is used for more than 
one person on a firm's UI wage report or does not have the required number of digits (including 
                                                
iii "Hiring Employees," <http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=98164,00.html>.  Also see, "Individual 
Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN)," <http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96287,00.html>. 
iv See "Disclosure and Verification of Social Security Numbers (SSNs) for the Section 235 Program" (9 November 
1990), <http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/files/90-39ml.txt> (accessed 8 February 2011). 
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zeros), the SSN is considered invalid. 
 The possibility that someone fraudulently uses a valid SSN assigned to someone else 
poses a special problem.  First of all, the SSN will show up multiple times across firms in one 
quarter for workers with different surnames (the wage report includes the first three characters of 
the workers' surnames).  With this information alone, it is not possible to know which worker is 
using the SSN fraudulently and who the valid owner of the number is.  If one of the 
SSN/surname pairs shows up in the data initially in a quarter by itself, this is the pair that is 
considered valid and all other duplicates (with different surnames) are considered invalid.  
 A.2. Does "Invalid" mean "Undocumented?" 
 Not all invalid SSN are classified as undocumented workers; examining the patterns of 
incidence of different types of invalid SSNs suggests that some types are firm generated rather 
than worker generated.  Figure 1 illustrates the incidence patterns across types of invalid SSNs in 
construction.  The percent of workers with SSNs having a high area number or out-of-sequence 
group number displays the expected growth in undocumented workers, whereas the incidence of 
SSNs for other reasons exhibits a flat to declining, highly seasonal pattern (this seasonality 
appears in all other sectors, as well).v  The strong seasonal nature of the other invalid reasons 
suggests that firms are temporarily assigning invalid SSN numbers to workers before having 
time to gather the information for the purpose of record keeping/reporting.  Or, firms may decide 
to not bother obtaining a SSN for workers who will only be employed a very short time.vi  The 
high degree of churning observed among workers with invalid SSNs for these other reasons is 
                                                
v Documentation of growth in undocumented workers can be found in Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and 
Christopher Campbell, "Estimates of the Unauthorized Population Residing in the United States: January 2006," 
Population Estimates (Washington D.C.: US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 
February 2009). 
vi Indeed, a worker has 90 days to resolve a discrepancy that results in the receipt of a "no-match" letter from the 
Social Security Administration.  The employee may be long gone before such a letter is even received. 
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consistent with either of these practices.   
[Figure A1 here] 
 Since there is no way to know whether a temporary assignment by the firm of an invalid 
SSN is to merely cover for temporary employment of an undocumented worker or to allow the 
firm to file its wage report before having had a chance to record the worker's valid SSN, the 
analysis below takes the conservative tack by considering as undocumented only those workers 
whose SSNs are classified as invalid because the area number is too high or the group number is 
assigned out of sequence; workers with invalid SSNs for any other reason are considered neither 
undocumented nor documented and, thus, are excluded from the analysis.  This will clearly 
undercount the actual number of undocumented workers.  However, all workers, regardless of 
SSN classification, are included in counts of aggregate firm employment.  
 
 
Figure A1. 
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Appendix B: Definitions of broad sectors, industry skill, and industry labor intensity. 
 B.1. Definitions of Broad Sectors 
 Throughout this paper, regressors are measured at different levels of industry 
aggregation.  The process of matching is performed at the broad sector level, which are defined 
based on two-digit NAICS classifications.  These classifications are designed to match as closely 
as possible the former SIC classifications and are reported in Table A1. 
 
Table B1: Definitions of broad sectors based on 2-digit NAICS classifications. 
Sector Included  
2-digit 
NAICS 
Agriculture and Natural Resources 11, 21 
Construction 23 
Manufacturing 31-33 
Transportation and Utilities 22, 48-49 
Wholesale Trade 42 
Retail Trade 44-45 
Financial Activities 52-53 
Information 51 
Professional and Business Services (includes temporary services) 54-56 
Education and Health Services 61-62 
Leisure and Hospitality 71-72 
Other Services  
(includes private household, laundry, and repair and maintenance services) 
81 
 
 
 B.2. Construction of the Measure of Industry Labor Intensity 
 Labor intensity for each industry is based on coefficients from the U.S. Input-Output (I-
O) Benchmark Tables 2002 (http://www.bea.gov/industry/index.htm#benchmark_io).  The labor 
intensity coefficient is defined as the share of compensation of employees (wage bill) in total 
industry output. Compensation of employees includes wages and salaries and their supplements. 
Total industry output is the sum of the products consumed by the industry, compensation of 
employees, taxes on production and imports less subsidies, and gross operating surplus.   
 - B2 - 
 
 B.3. Construction of Industry Skill 
 Each industry is assigned a skill intensity based on the weighted average of educational 
attainment of workers in that industry, using the Current Population Survey for 1994.  This year 
was chosen since this is the first year in which the nativity (place of birth) of respondents is 
reported.  For each industry, the percent of workers with less than a high school education 
(LTHS), a high school education (HS), some college (SCOLL), college degree (COLL), and 
graduate education (GRAD) is calculated.  The regressor HigherEducation is the share of 
workers in the firm's industry with a college or graduate education. 
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Appendix C: Matching strategy and first stage matching results. 
 A combination of exact- and propensity score one-to-one matching without replacement 
is used.  For each worker employed in a firm that hires undocumented workers, a set of potential 
controls is constructed from workers in the same year, quarter, and sector who are employed by 
firms not hiring undocumented worker.  Among these candidate controls, the treated worker's 
match is chosen as that control with the closest propensity score.  The propensity score for all 
workers is constructed by estimating a logit model with the dependent variable equal to one for 
workers employed by firms who hire undocumented workers.  Determinants for this outcome 
include both worker and firm characteristics, most of which are also included in the second stage 
wage equation.  Dehejia and Wahba (2002) show that without-replacement matching can reduce 
the quality of the match when few control candidates are available.  However, when there are a 
large number of control candidates, as is the case here, one-to-one matching improves the 
precision of the estimates. 
 Preserving the longitudinal nature of the data makes the matching process more 
complicated.  It is conceivable that a match is found for a treated worker in only one quarter of 
their observations; this worker  (along with its control) will be rejected because of a lack of 
multiple observations with which to control for fixed effects.  An iterative process takes place 
after the matching exercise to ensure that the number of remaining single observations of 
workers and firms is minimized for the final wage estimation.22 
 Table C1 presents evidence of the quality of the matching through a comparison of the 
bias that exists between the controls (workers employed at firms that do not hire undocumented 
workers) and the treated (workers employed at firms that do hire undocumented).  For this effect 
                                                
22 The final sample will have only a very small number of workers with only one observation.  The goal was to 
minimize the occurrence of singles in order to have confidence in the standard errors of the estimates; too many 
singles will produce inappropriately small standard errors. 
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two statistics are provided: the standardized difference test (%bias) and a test of equality of 
means (t-test).  
The t-tests reject equality of the variable means, for both the unmatched and matched 
sample. This result is not unexpected considering that we have over 16 million observations, and 
that the standard deviation of the mean tends to zero with such sample size. Still, there is a 
considerable reduction on the t-statistics for the matched sample.   
 Considering the sample size, the standardized bias statistic is perhaps more suitable to 
test the quality of the matching, since it does not depend on the number of observations in the 
sample. Before matching it is evident that there are considerable differences in the controls 
between treatment and comparison group. With a bias of ranging from 2 to 108 percent, only 4 
of the covariates showed a difference that could be considered “small” compared to the threshold 
suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) of 20 percent. After matching, all the differences are 
considerably reduced with a median bias reduction of 91 percent (ranging in absolute value from 
a 54 percent reduction to a 99.5 percent reduction). Further, all covariates present less than eight 
percent bias (ranging from 0.4 to 8 percent), supporting the quality of the matching.23  
  
                                                
23 The full set of bias statistics is available upon request (for the full sample and for each sector separately). 
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Table C1. T-Test and Bias statistic before and after Matching/trimming 
Full Sample 
Unmatched Matched 
Pd=0 Pd=1 %bias t-test Pd=0 Pd=1 %bias t-test 
Share of Wkrs with 
higher education 
0.25 0.20 29.74 1328.29 0.20 0.21 2.81 17.41 
(0.16) (0.15)   (0.15) (0.16)   Labor intensity 0.39 0.43 28.19 1158.23 0.39 0.39 1.33 37.67 
  (0.13) (0.18) 
 
  (0.14) (0.14) 
 
  
Worker tenure 12.08 9.20 22.97 1041.09 9.78 10.66 7.43 210.37 
  (13.26) (11.76) 
 
  (11.38) (12.39) 
 
  
Worker tenure^2 0.32 0.22 17.13 791.62 0.23 0.27 7.96 225.40 
  (0.63) (0.52) 
 
  (0.49) (0.56) 
 
  
Worker experience 26.17 21.70 28.23 1246.35 23.82 24.21 2.50 70.92 
  (15.92) (15.74) 
 
  (15.52) (15.76) 
 
  
Worker experience^2 0.94 0.72 24.26 1094.45 0.81 0.83 2.93 83.04 
  (0.95) (0.86) 
 
  (0.89) (0.91) 
 
  
New Hire 0.16 0.26 23.99 1015.18 0.19 0.18 2.21 62.60 
  (0.37) (0.44) 
 
  (0.39) (0.39) 
 
  
Separating 0.16 0.25 22.89 968.94 0.19 0.18 2.64 74.78 
  (0.36) (0.43) 
 
  (0.40) (0.39) 
 
  
Age of firm 31.07 30.75 1.98 87.89 32.69 32.55 0.86 24.32 
  (16.67) (16.24) 
 
  (16.25) (16.33) 
 
  
Age^2 1243.56 1209.06 3.21 142.48 1332.71 1326.16 0.60 16.97 
  (1094.11) (1055.74) 
 
  (1091.79) (1094.43) 
 
  
Log total employment 3.83 5.73 107.78 4861.28 5.16 5.21 3.28 92.99 
  (1.85) (1.67) 
 
  (1.56) (1.48) 
 
  
Churning 0.22 0.41 65.64 2720.49 0.32 0.31 3.83 108.48 
  (0.26) (0.34) 
 
  (0.30) (0.25) 
 
  
Cnty unemployment 4.51 4.43 6.26 281.73 4.43 4.44 0.74 20.82 
  (1.39) (1.26) 
 
  (1.27) (1.31) 
 
  
Pop. Density 945.08 1081.94 17.91 792.04 1003.15 1003.74 0.08 2.15 
  (771.59) (756.76) 
 
  (775.08) (776.89) 
 
  
Share of Hispanic 
students 
0.05 0.05 10.92 476.10 0.05 0.05 0.38 10.81 
(0.05) (0.05)     (0.05) (0.05) 
 
  
No of observations 73,555,444 26,313,397   16,042,501 16,042,501    
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Table C2. Logit estimation of the probability of being employed by a firm that hires undocumented workers. 
 Parameter Estimates 
(st. errors) 
Marginal Effect 
Worker Characteristics   
Worker tenure (in quarters) -0.003*** 0.000 
 (0.000)   
Worker tenure squared / 1000 0.002 0.000 
 (0.002)   
Worker experience (in quarters) -0.021*** -0.003 
 (0.000)   
Worker experience squared / 1000 0.148*** 0.021 
 (0.001)   
Worker is new hire = 1 -0.088*** -0.012 
 (0.001)   
Worker is separating = 1 -0.025*** -0.003 
 (0.001)   
Firm Characteristics   
Age of firm (in quarters) 0.012*** 0.002 
 (0.000)   
Age of firm squared / 100 0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.000)   
Log total employment (firm size) 0.726*** 0.103 
 (0.000)   
Churning at worker's firm (documented wrkrs only) 1.890*** 0.267 
(0.001)   
Share of workers with higher education -2.252*** -0.318 
(0.003)   
Labor intensity -0.241*** -0.034 
 (0.003)   
Geographic Controls   
County unemployment rate -0.039*** -0.006 
 (0.000)   
Population density /1000 0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.000)   
Percent of students that is Hispanic 3.072*** 0.434 
 (0.006)   
   
Intercept -3.459***  
 (0.012)  
No. of Observations   
Note:  Analysis includes documented workers employed in Georgia 1995-2005 inclusive.  Also included as regressors are 
broad sector industry fixed effects (see Appendix B) and year and quarter fixed effects, as well as sector/year interactions. 
*** statistically significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level, ** statistically significantly different from 
zero at the 95% confidence level, and * statistically significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence level.. 
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Appendix D: Sector specific wage results. 
Table D1. Linear, fixed-effects estimation of log wages, by sector. 
 
Dependent variable = Ln wage Agriculture Construction Manufacturing 
Trans, Comm 
&Util 
Firm hires undocumented wrkrs:  0.0577*** -0.0026* 0.0099*** 0.046*** 
  (0.0103) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0030) 
  
   
  
Coefficients on percent undocumented 
interaction are available upon request. 
   
  
Order of preferred Specification K= 6 1 6 6 
  
   
  
Worker Characteristics         
Worker tenure (in quarters) 0.0084*** 0.0044*** 0.0059*** 0.0069*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0006) 
Worker tenure squared / 1000 -0.1181*** -0.0822*** -0.1155*** -0.1316*** 
  (0.0111) (0.0033) (0.0017) (0.0080) 
Worker experience (in quarters) 0.0036** 0.0174*** 0.0123*** 0.000141289 
  (0.0016) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0014) 
Worker experience squared / 1000 -0.0704*** -0.1277*** -0.0561*** 0.0256*** 
  (0.0111) (0.0033) (0.0018) (0.0065) 
Worker is new hire = 1 -0.5236*** -0.6787*** -0.7446*** -0.6918*** 
  (0.0049) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0029) 
Worker is separating = 1 -0.6911*** -0.8643*** -0.9279*** -0.9267*** 
  (0.0046) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0029) 
Firm Characteristics 
   
  
Age of firm (in quarters) -0.0027 -0.0011 -0.005*** -0.005** 
  (0.0025) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0025) 
Age of firm squared / 100 0.00004*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Log total employment (firm size) 0.2455*** 0.19*** 0.1332*** 0.163*** 
  (0.0046) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0042) 
Churning at worker's firm (among  
documented workers only) 0.2368*** 0.107*** 0.1213*** 0.1627*** 
  (0.0082) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0076) 
Share of workers with higher 
education -2.823** 
 
0.03176 -0.08251 
  (1.2616) 
 
(0.0289) (0.2191) 
Labor intensity -0.3536 -0.0486 -0.2308*** 0.1337 
  (0.2177) (0.1159) (0.0426) (0.1313) 
Geographic Controls         
County unemployment rate -0.0048*** 0.0023*** -0.0032*** -0.0326*** 
  (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0016) 
Population density /1000 -0.00009*** 0.000001 0.00004*** -0.0001*** 
  (0.00002) (0.000003) (0.000002) (0.00001) 
Percent of students that is 
Hispanic -0.10857 -0.2191*** 0.0841*** -1.0788*** 
  (0.0976) (0.0322) (0.0153) (0.0825) 
   
  
  
R-squared 0.7931 0.7850 0.8101 0.8131 
       
No. of Observations 384,138 3,358,162 6,339,192 900,136 
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Table D1, cont. 
 
Dependent variable = Ln wage 
Wholesale 
Trade Retail Trade 
Financial 
Services Information 
Firm hires undocumented wrkrs:  0.0163*** -0.0024 0.0025 0.0253*** 
  (0.0027) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0041) 
  
   
  
Coefficients on percent undocumented interaction 
are available upon request. 
   
  
Order of preferred Specification K= 6 1 2 6 
  
   
  
Worker Characteristics         
Worker tenure (in quarters) 0.0066*** 0.0071*** -0.0004 0.0119*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0009) 
Worker tenure squared / 1000 -0.0983*** -0.0847*** -0.0576*** -0.1295*** 
  (0.0047) (0.0057) (0.0078) (0.0109) 
Worker experience (in quarters) 0.0052*** 0.0075*** 0.0366*** 0.0028 
  (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0028) 
Worker experience squared / 1000 -0.0585*** -0.0993*** -0.0996*** -0.0461*** 
  (0.0045) (0.0054) (0.0075) (0.0103) 
Worker is new hire = 1 -0.7167*** -0.773*** -0.6995*** -0.6416*** 
  (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0030) (0.0043) 
Worker is separating = 1 -0.8964*** -1.0242*** -0.954*** -0.7043*** 
  (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0030) (0.0041) 
Firm Characteristics 
   
  
Age of firm (in quarters) -0.0046** -0.0128*** 0.0198*** -0.0992*** 
  (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0048) (0.0064) 
Age of firm squared / 100 0.00005*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Log total employment (firm size) 0.1188*** 0.0862*** 0.0834*** 0.0922*** 
  (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0045) (0.0058) 
Churning at worker's firm (among  
documented workers only) 0.1052*** 0.1733*** 0.1553*** 0.2039*** 
  (0.0054) (0.0057) (0.0098) (0.0145) 
Share of workers with higher education 
  
0.00150 3.5482*** 
  
  
(0.1698) (1.3180) 
Labor intensity 
  
0.1508 0.8861*** 
  
  
(0.1467) (0.2736) 
Geographic Controls         
County unemployment rate -0.00689*** 0.0048*** -0.0052** 0.011*** 
  (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0028) 
Population density /1000 0.000004 -0.00003*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
  (0.000004) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Percent of students that is Hispanic 0.2644*** 0.02538 -0.16630 -1.1929*** 
  (0.0372) (0.0571) (0.1027) (0.1433) 
   
  
  
R-squared 0.8416 0.8522 0.8380 0.8772 
       
No. of Observations 1,242,614 1,567,908 653,832 320,958 
 
  
 - D3 - 
Table D1, cont. 
 
Dependent variable = Ln wage 
Prof & Bus 
Services 
Education & 
Health 
Leisure & 
Hospitality 
Other 
Services 
Firm hires undocumented wrkrs:  0.0022 -0.003*** 0.0037* -0.0048 
  (0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0021) (0.0036) 
  
   
  
Coefficients on percent undocumented interaction are 
available upon request. 
   
  
Order of preferred Specification K= 6 2 4 1 
  
   
  
Worker Characteristics         
Worker tenure (in quarters) 0.0059*** 0.0143*** 0.0062*** 0.0078*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0008) 
Worker tenure squared / 1000 -0.0656*** -0.1608*** -0.0414*** -0.1063*** 
  (0.0053) (0.0021) (0.0055) (0.0113) 
Worker experience (in quarters) 0.0102*** 0.0149*** 0.0053*** 0.0034* 
  (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0019) 
Worker experience squared / 1000 -0.0637*** -0.0662*** -0.1042*** -0.0508*** 
  (0.0041) (0.0024) (0.0045) (0.0098) 
Worker is new hire = 1 -0.6697*** -0.6762*** -0.7234*** -0.6732*** 
  (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0037) 
Worker is separating = 1 -0.8558*** -0.8565*** -0.9065*** -0.8469*** 
  (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0036) 
Firm Characteristics 
   
  
Age of firm (in quarters) -0.0195*** -0.0164*** -0.0114*** -0.0081** 
  (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0038) 
Age of firm squared / 100 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.00004*** 0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Log total employment (firm size) 0.1505*** 0.161*** 0.183*** 0.0927*** 
  (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0058) 
Churning at worker's firm (among  
documented workers only) 0.1379*** 0.1268*** 0.1503*** 0.1104*** 
  (0.0039) (0.0048) (0.0036) (0.0085) 
Share of workers with higher education 0.0818*** 0.1425** 0.10800   
  (0.0236) (0.0638) (0.1556)   
Labor intensity -0.0123 0.5269*** 0.3502 0.2264 
  (0.0358) (0.1548) (0.2815) (0.3267) 
Geographic Controls         
County unemployment rate -0.0106*** -0.0075*** -0.0046*** -0.0104*** 
  (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0028) 
Population density /1000 0.000004 -0.00002*** 0.00001* 0.00001 
  (0.000004) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Percent of students that is Hispanic -0.02190 -0.1525*** -0.0946* 0.214* 
  (0.0506) (0.0301) (0.0521) (0.1286) 
   
  
  
R-squared 0.8747 0.8304 0.8182 0.8498 
       
No. of Observations 3,972,320 5,112,496 3,676,432 521,206 
 
Note: See Appendix B for sector definitions.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Analysis includes documented 
workers employed in Georgia 1995-2005 inclusive.  Also included as regressors are year and quarter fixed effects, 
as well as sector/year interactions.   𝑃!" is measured from 0 to 100.  *** statistically significantly different from zero 
at the 99% confidence level, ** statistically significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level, and * 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence level. 
